The Nuclear Issue in the South Pacific: Labor Parties, Trade Union Movements, and Pacific Island Churches in International Relations by Regnault, Jean-Marc
Since the end of World War II, various negotiations, with or without the
immediate agreement of the two “superpowers” of the time, the United
States and the Soviet Union, have been undertaken in order to prevent a
military nuclear presence or even the use of civil nuclear power in some
parts of the world (the nuclear-weapon-free zones)—or indeed in space.
Following treaties relating to the Antarctic (1959) and Latin America (Tla-
telolco Treaty, 1967), the Treaty of Rarotonga (Cook Islands), signed on
6 August 1985, seeks to make the South Pacific nuclear free. More recent
treaties concern Southeast Asia and Africa (Szurek 1997). In addition,
some cities, such as Faa‘a, on Tahiti, have proclaimed themselves “nuclear
free” without this status having any legal value.
France has generally shown reticence with regard to such treaties.1 This
was the case with the Treaty of Rarotonga before France decided to sign
it in 1996. In the South Pacific, France has been the focus of opposition
from states, trade unions, and churches because it needed to use the South
Pacific, which the Anglo-Saxon powers readily consider their backyard.
However, France was not the only country to be targeted. From the early
1970s, under the leadership of New Zealand, the Pacific Island countries
embarked on what they considered a new crusade, which was to lead to
the signing of the Treaty of Rarotonga.
The Cold War and Nuclear Testing in the Pacific
Through the 1951 Australia–New Zealand–United States (anzus) secu-
rity pact for the Pacific and the 1954 Southeast Asian Treaty Organiza-
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tion (seato), Australia and New Zealand took up a position in the con-
frontation between the power blocs, even though the nuclear threat did
not, in principle, affect them directly. Under these treaties, US warships did
not have to declare the nature of the weapons they carried. The govern-
ments did not initially react. But when the pacifist movement gathered
strength in the early 1980s, Australia and especially New Zealand had to
find an appropriate response, as nuclear testing was now taking place in
their region, where the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had already
disconcerted Pacific Island communities.
From 1945 to 1963, the United States carried out 232 atmospheric
nuclear tests. Those that took place in the Pacific occurred on Bikini Atoll
(42 explosions) and on Enewetak (60), both in the (now) Republic of the
Marshall Islands; on Johnston Island (11) in the Northeast Pacific; and
on Christmas (Kiritimati) Island (13), an atoll that is part of the present
Republic of Kiribati. The power of the explosion above Enewetak on
1 November 1952 left the island severely damaged.
The United Kingdom carried out its first atmospheric tests from 1952
on Montebello Island off Western Australia, in the Indian Ocean (3), and
on two supposedly deserted sites in South Australia, Emu Field and Mar-
alinga (10), with the approval of the Australian authorities, until 1957.
Ten other tests, thermonuclear in nature, took place on Malden and
Christmas Islands in the (then) British colony of the Gilbert Islands.
Some of the atmospheric testing was not carried out under optimum
safety conditions. The July 1946 atomic explosions on Bikini greatly
exceeded the forecast maximum radioactivity level. The communities of
the Micronesian islands of the US Trust Territories were displaced with-
out being able to return permanently to their ancestral homeland. With
the support of various protest movements, they took legal action against
Washington for compensation for the high cancer rates affecting them.
On 1 March 1954, the first thermonuclear bomb, Bravo, exploded over
Bikini (17 megatons rather than the announced 5). Forty-eight hours later,
the US Navy evacuated hundreds of people from Rongerik, Rongelap, and
Utirik. A Japanese fishing boat, the Fukuryu Maru, found itself in the fall-
out zone and its twenty-three crew members were seriously contaminated.
Henceforth, the US military conducted its testing in the greatest secrecy.
At Montebello in Australia, little concern was shown for local commu-
nities (some 5,000 people, mostly Aborigines). The testing carried out at
Maralinga and Emu Field caused the death of Aboriginal nomadic hunter-
gatherer groups who had been neither alerted nor removed from the test-
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ing zones. The British tried to clean up the area without much success. The
Federal Australian Radiation Laboratory maintains that tens of thousands
of pieces of plutonium-contaminated debris are still there, making any
human presence impossible.2 From 1957 to 1963, the British pursued their
atmospheric testing in the greatest secrecy in the Northeast Pacific, for
example, at Christmas Island.
Because it had never colonized the region nor conducted nuclear test-
ing in the South Pacific, the Soviet Union’s nuclear capability was not an
issue in the region.
As the destructive capacity was becoming terrifying, in 1959, the three
nuclear powers (United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union)
decided to establish a moratorium on nuclear testing, before realizing the
need to sign a test ban treaty. The first anti-nuclear movements could con-
sider that part of their goal had been achieved, but before signing the
Moscow Treaty (5 August 1963), the three powers accelerated the rate
and power of their tests.3 This being so, nuclear initiatives by France and
China, who were beginning testing in the early 1960s, could only be very
badly perceived, particularly in the Pacific.
When France had to abandon its testing ranges in the Sahara Desert, it
chose the South Pacific atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa in French Poly-
nesia as alternative sites (Regnault 2000) (see map 1). Testing began on
1 July 1966. On 24 August 1968, the first thermonuclear test took place
on Fangataufa. In the Pacific, France carried out 41 atmospheric tests
(1966–1974) and 140 underground tests (1975–1991 and 1995–1996).
Reaction by the people of French Polynesia may have taken quite a long
time to emerge, but other Pacific territories and states swiftly expressed
opposition.
Rising Opposition to French Testing,
but also to US Hegemony
Vigorous reactions met the announcement of the commissioning of the
Pacific Testing Center (Centre d’Experimentation du Pacifique, or cep).
The French government complained about the “systematic campaign con-
ducted in New Zealand against its testing plans.”4 A union leader in New
Zealand stated that de Gaulle had “a ridiculous attitude on the issue of
nuclear weapons.”5 New Zealand’s Conservative prime minister declared
his country’s “aversion to nuclear testing.”6 At the United Nations, New
Zealand claimed to be the only country “to have stressed the hazards of
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nuclear testing in the Pacific.”7 The Labour Party opposition supported
the idea of a boycott of French goods, “even if the New Zealand econ-
omy had to suffer,” and also proposed the establishment of nuclear-free
zones and the banning of nuclear weapons,8 which the Conservative gov-
ernment rejected.
The New Zealand unions were joined by their Australian counterparts:
“The Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Hasluck, declared on 4th
November 1964 to his French counterpart, Couve de Murville, that he
was resigned to continued testing but feared proliferation and fallout and
therefore desired consultation” (Vaïsse 1998, 377).
This agitation elicited a virulent response from General de Gaulle, who
did not understand how French policy in this area could be attacked,
because “our bomb is a peaceful one and it is the most peaceful thing
we’ve invented since France came into existence”; for the general, New
Zealand protests could only come from “old spinsters’ societies” (Peyre-
fitte 1997, 120–124). But he clearly understood the thinking in the region,
which he had visited in 1956. His comments also referred to Tahiti’s his-
tory, the Pritchard Affair in particular.9 De Gaulle observed that neither
Australia nor New Zealand had protested to Washington, London, or
Moscow about their testing (Vaïsse 1998, 377). He was not really sur-
prised to learn that “the Tahitian pastors meet English and American pas-
tors who raise anti-French sentiment in them and Pacific Island pastors
with whom they get mutually agitated,” but the extension of such oppo-
sition did not bother him greatly. What was important for him was “that
the construction of our nuclear force is a very important matter for France
and the construction of the Pacific Testing Center is a great French proj-
ect” (Peyrefitte 1997, 120–124). And it is precisely around that issue that
opposition to France in the Pacific developed or was resuscitated. The
Pacific Island countries applied logic that must be understood: “The coun-
tries of the region consider that this nuclear testing, far from indirectly
protecting them against a threat to the Western world in the context of
the Cold War . . . would force them into the spiral of terror in the event
of nuclear conflict” (Cordonnier 1995, 21).
For these countries, the atomic weapon is not considered a deterrent
but an instrument of total destruction. Themes uniting pre-Christian or
Christian religious myths and ecology were revived: God gave the Pacific
Islanders their land pure and untouched. The French were polluting the
atmosphere and the entrails of the earth on those two atolls. This was
against God’s will because he wanted to see the purity of these islands
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maintained.10 “If the testing is not dangerous, then why not choose a site
in mainland France?” was a frequently asked question.
New Zealand was France’s ally and friend. General de Gaulle confided
to New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake, “France will not forget the
bonds of friendship that it has with New Zealand, especially since the
two world wars” (Vaïsse 1998, 203). But France had disappointed New
Zealand. From the early 1970s (and in particular between 1972 and 1975,
when Labour was in power), New Zealand embarked on a series of mea-
sures in order to
• have French nuclear testing outlawed by the United Nations;
• lay the matter before the International Court of Justice (as the court
had ordered the halt after France had stopped atmospheric testing,
it considered the complaint lodged by Australia and New Zealand
no longer valid); and
• plan to set up a nuclear-free zone.
Although more moderate, Australia supported its neighbor’s approach.
The action taken was negatively perceived by the United States, because
Australia and New Zealand seemed to be aligning themselves with the
communist and Third World countries on this issue. 
During the same period, in Wellington in 1971, the first meeting was
held of the member countries of the South Pacific Forum, this being an
institution within which independent countries could address their devel-
opment priorities.11 Australia and New Zealand were not supposed to
become members, but the need to find funding for the organization
required their inclusion.12
The Forum rapidly became an active diplomatic instrument against
France. It bitterly challenged nuclear testing in French Polynesia and “colo-
nialism” in New Caledonia. It consistently criticized the “arrogant” atti-
tude of France. Wellington and Canberra led a hostile campaign against
France. Outside the Forum, other countries were also concerned about
French testing. The Chilean Senate denounced “a threat for neighboring
countries,” while Peru threatened to break off its diplomatic relations with
France.13
In French Polynesia itself, anti-nuclear activism developed under pres-
sure from local autonomists and French and foreign pacifists.14 However,
France was not the only country in their sights. The United States was
increasingly perceived as indirectly threatening regional peace and secu-
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rity. New Zealand was often in the vanguard of this combat, without
really jeopardizing the ties between the Anglo-Saxon powers.
In Fiji, in 1970, a religious anti-nuclear movement was born: atom
(Against Tests On Moruroa).15 Its members belonged to the Protestant
Pacific Theological College in Suva, the University of the South Pacific,
and the Fiji Young Men’s Christian Association (ymca). Quickly securing
the support of the Pacific Conference of Churches,16 atom organized the
first Nuclear-free Pacific Conference in 1975. On 11 December 1975, the
UN General Assembly considered a resolution on this topic, jointly signed
by New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji, and adopted it by 110
votes to 0 with 20 abstentions, including the United States and the Soviet
Union.
atom broadened its base by including trade unions, nongovernmental
organizations, women’s movements, religious groups, and a range of dis-
armament lobbies. atom’s arguments were as follows: If all Islands
enjoyed constitutional independence, the colonial powers would be forced
to do their testing elsewhere. It was therefore necessary for all Island
groups to achieve independence.
The South Pacific countries saluted the victory of François Mitterrand
in 1981, but they had not measured the changes in the French socialist
movement at the end of the 1970s. The new president considered that “to
give up any of the current defense resources at all” would be equivalent
to giving up French independence (quoted in Fisher 1982, 79). 
The 1983 Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Conference held in Port
Vila planned the introduction of a nuclear-free zone including, in addition
to the South Pacific, Micronesia, the Philippines, Japan, and Hawai‘i. All
nuclear weapons would be banned, including those onboard ships. The
conference also demanded independence for the Kanaks, a halt to the
Indonesian transmigration policy in Irian Jaya,17 the closure of US military
bases in the Philippines, a ban on the dumping of nuclear waste in the
Pacific Ocean, and a halt to the use of Kwajalein Atoll as a target for mx
missiles. The positions taken at this conference were “maximalist.”18
In August 1984, the Forum decided to draft a treaty to make the Pacific
Islands region a nuclear-free zone. This task was entrusted to a working
group and to the lawyers of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Australia,
which had taken a moderate position. Australian Prime Minister Bob
Hawke intended to maintained freedom of movement in international
waters and the sovereignty of each regional state in terms of transit autho-
rizations through national waters or visits to regional ports.19
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The parties agreed to meet the following year in Rarotonga, Cook
Islands, to sign the desired treaty.
1984–1995: The Misfortunes of 
the Rarotonga Treaty
The treaty ran into troubled waters during its preparation and in its imple-
mentation.
The working group adopted the following principles: no use, no test-
ing, and no stationing of explosive nuclear devices in the Pacific. The plan
was to propose them as binding protocols to the five nuclear powers (now
including France and China). But in terms of international law, how could
such a ban be adopted without discrediting the treaty from the outset?
What would be the name of the future nuclear-free zone: “Pacific”? But
that was too general. “South Pacific” was too restrictive, although it did
stress the regional identity. “Nuclear-free zone” was preferred to “nuclear-
weapon-free zone,” as this terminology made it possible to include the
dumping of radioactive waste at sea as well ( Japan was referred to here).
But despite the consensus commitment to achieving this goal, there
remained major differences between the Forum states. Australia, who
played the main role in the process, led the moderate camp. Fiji attached
itself to this group, after giving up its extreme positions, because it needed
financial support from the United States.
In the “maximalist” camp stood Walter Lini (an Anglican priest, prime
minister of Vanuatu from 1980 to 1991; an Anglophone, he had often
expressed his opposition to the French position in the Pacific) and espe-
cially his New Zealand counterpart, David Lange. The Labour Party’s
1984 victory was Lange’s own; his program focused on the environment,
pacifism, and the need to ban nuclear activities. For Lange, a strict Protes-
tant, notions of general disarmament and world peace went hand in hand
with the moral obligation to oppose any use of nuclear energy. He had
another strongly worded draft prepared, reflecting the frame of mind of
New Zealand, which, in order to step onto the international stage,
intended to become the representative for pacifist and ecologist utopias.
The signing of the treaty was scheduled for 6 August 1985 during the
Forum summit in Rarotonga. Some sixty journalists attended and pre-
pared various reports on “the French colonial presence” in New Caledo-
nia and the oppression of the Kanaks, French nuclear testing, and some
historical material on US and British nuclear accidents in the region,
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among other topics. Further spice was added the same week by the reve-
lation that the supposed Swiss newlyweds, “Alain and Sophie Turenge”
responsible for the sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior, which was sunk on
10 July that year in Auckland Harbour, were in fact two French army
officers. The Pacific Islanders were shocked because they considered this
as an “act of state terrorism.” 
Delegations from all Forum member countries and nongovernmental
organizations such as Greenpeace attended the summit, as did Kanak
independence movement representatives and Gaston Flosse, president of
French Polynesia.
Despite his positions, David Lange was appointed to chair the summit.
Bob Hawke used the independence issue in New Caledonia, which he sup-
ported, to gain the support of other Forum members on the minimalist
nuclear-free-zone treaty project and also reconquer his labor electorate,
who were disappointed by his domestic policies. The Melanesian states
considered the “Australian” draft too timid and also wanted to express
unconditional support for the Kanak cause.
The anti-nuclear lobby believed that the priority was the treaty, not the
status of New Caledonia. Other considerations disrupted the serenity of
the summit: Kiribati, for example, wanted to enter into a financial agree-
ment with the Soviet Union in the fisheries area, as it could no longer wait
for the United States to deliver on its promises.
After the necessary compromises, the final communiqué referred to self-
determination in New Caledonia and its inscription on the list of the UN
Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization.20 Reference was made to
trade, political, and development cooperation, as well as support for the
Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, which were undergoing US
pressure over nuclear issues. French nuclear testing and nuclear waste
dumping in the ocean were deplored.
The treaty itself includes a very general preamble on “a world at peace”
and the concern to “keep the region free of environmental pollution by
radioactive wastes”; sixteen articles; and four annexes defining the geo-
graphical boundaries of the zone and specifying arrangements to monitor
implementation of the three protocols intended for the major powers. It
goes further than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [first signed on
1 July 1968 by sixty-two countries] by banning nuclear arms and devices
from the territories of the parties, under whoever’s control they may be,
and by banning the “stationing of any nuclear explosive device” (Article
5), but the transit of ships is not explicitly banned. Article 5 leaves it up
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to each state to refuse or to allow visits by ships that could carry such
nuclear devices.
The treaty was first signed and then gradually ratified over time by ten
countries: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Solo-
mon Islands, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, and Western Samoa. Two coun-
tries categorically refused to sign the treaty for different reasons: Vanuatu
(because the treaty did not ban visits by ships) and Tonga (which had
never been anti-nuclear). Vanuatu finally signed it in September 1995 and
ratified it, since new Prime Minister Maxime Carlot was more moderate
than his predecessor. [Tonga signed the treaty in 2000.]
Bob Hawke was given a bad time by the press, who considered his atti-
tude hypocritical, since Australia sold uranium to France. Concerning the
ban on the stationing of nuclear-powered vessels, David Lange wondered
what distinction Australia made between transit and prolonged calls at
ports, since US nuclear submarines called at Fremantle, Western Australia.
On the New Zealand side, the press welcomed this treaty even if its
value was symbolic. The prime minister stated that France would again
give an arrogant image of itself if it did not sign at least two of the three
protocols. France was not the only country that came in for criticism.
Australians and New Zealanders stressed the fact that the treaty should
strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and encourage other countries to
go down the same road: the treaty was just one step toward worldwide
peace and security.
For the treaty to have value, it would have to be approved by the major
powers. All were favorable, in principle, to the emergence of nuclear-
weapon-free zones, but the United Kingdom, France, and China wished
to reduce the gap in size between the arsenals of the two superpowers on
the one hand and theirs on the other. France raised three extra conditions:
• nuclear disarmament should go together with a total ban on testing;
• there should be a correction of major imbalances in terms of chem-
ical and conventional weaponry; and
• no new system, particularly defensive, should imperil the current
foundations of deterrence and, therefore, peace.
After becoming prime minister in 1986, Jacques Chirac introduced a Sec-
retariat of State for South Pacific affairs. He appointed Polynesian Gaston
Flosse to head this office.21 Flosse’s task was to renew dialogue with the
region and justify French positions. His action mainly focused on the Poly-
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nesian triangle and Fiji. He invited various leading political figures from
the area to Moruroa and developed an image of France somewhat differ-
ent from that to which the media had accustomed the people of the area.
A South Pacific assistance and cooperation fund was placed at his dis-
posal. However, France confirmed its hostility to the treaty’s first proto-
col, which it considered “prejudicial to Western interests.”22
The United Kingdom had to contend with the fact that the moderniza-
tion and testing of its nuclear weapons, as well as their possible condi-
tions of use, were dependent on the United States, and that much of the
UK political spectrum (Labour and Liberal parties) was opposed to the
concept of nuclear deterrence. London’s evasive position inconvenienced
Paris, since Moscow was stepping up its attempts to interfere in the South
Pacific area.23
The increasingly hostile attitude of New Zealand, which in 1987 banned
from its ports vessels containing nuclear explosives or operating with
nuclear power, irritated the United States, which decided to expel this
country from the anzus pact. In response to New Zealand and Soviet
agitation, on 5 February 1987, Washington announced its official refusal
to sign the protocols. The United Kingdom followed suit on 20 March of
the same year.
The day after the summit, the tass news agency on behalf of the Soviet
Union congratulated the Forum countries for adopting the treaty despite
pressure from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The
Soviet Union signed the second and third protocols (as the first protocol
only concerned states with territories in this area) on 15 December 1986.
Because the treaty advocated a certain amount of independence from the
two superpowers, China ratified it on 21 October 1988.
The Rarotonga treaty was particularly designed to oppose French
nuclear testing. President François Mitterrand did try to improve France’s
image in the Pacific,24 but without much real success. From 1991 on, he
changed French policy by announcing his wish to sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treatry. For domestic and foreign policy reasons, in April
1992 he decided to suspend testing for one year. He said that France
wanted to call a halt to over-arming and the build-up of nuclear weapons
in the world. This earned France the congratulations of the South Pacific
countries.25 This unilateral moratorium did not in any way mean that he
was giving up the principle of nuclear deterrence, which remained the
cornerstone of French defense policy. US President George Bush, initially
reluctant, agreed to a nine-month moratorium. In 1993 France extended
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its moratorium indefinitely, and US President Bill Clinton announced a
fifteen-month moratorium and an intention to draft a multilateral Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty.
On 13 June 1995, the new French president, Jacques Chirac, announced
a final nuclear testing program in French Polynesia, citing technical con-
siderations and the need to maintain his country’s deterrent. Domestic
policy considerations also explained his decision; he who claimed to be
de Gaulle’s successor had to make deterrence a priority. At the same time,
Chirac expressed France’s determination to sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, once it was ready, and the Treaty of Rarotonga.
While protests grew ever more vocal in South Pacific countries, sup-
ported by the World Council of Churches,26 and Fiji suggested that France
should withdraw its ambassador, peaceful marches mobilized thousands
of people in Tahiti in June and July 1995, prompted by the independence
movements and the Evangelical Church.
On 5 September 1995, the first of the six nuclear devices of the final pro-
gram was exploded. The next day, violent rioting broke out in the capi-
tal Papeete, filmed by journalists from all over the world, attracted by the
prospects of a spectacular confrontation between the army and Green-
peace, which had promised that five boats would be sent to the territor-
ial waters of French Polynesia. The rioting left twenty hurt, four of them
seriously. Damage was estimated at millions of Pacific francs. Relayed by
television channels, images of extreme violence threw a deep shadow over
French Polynesia’s image in the outside world, where tourism was one of
the country’s vital resources. More than 10,000 demonstrators gathered
in the capital the following Saturday to criticize, first of all, the attitude
of the French State, which had not wanted to take action to prevent the
rioting taking place, as well as the use of violence by some independence
movement and trade union leaders.
The five remaining French nuclear tests took place with no reaction in
the territory. Each test was announced to wide regional and international
disapproval. The last test took place on 27 January 1996.
From 1996 to the Present: Back to the Happy Isles?
On 20 October 1995, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
announced their intention to sign the three protocols. Ten years after the
Rarotonga Summit, the nuclear-free South Pacific was on the verge of
becoming a reality. In the meantime, the world had changed and the
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Pacific Islands had certainly lost some of their importance to the great
powers. Why should they refuse to sign the treaty any longer?
On 29 January 1996, President Chirac announced the final halting of
French nuclear testing. He gave Gaston Flosse authority to sign the three
protocols in Suva on 25 March 1996. The ceremony took place in the pres-
ence of the US and UK ambassadors, who were cosignatories with Gaston
Flosse on behalf of their respective countries.
As it had done with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in signing this treaty
France expressed reservations and made interpretative statements, such
as: “No provision of the protocols or articles of the Treaty to which they
refer may harm the full exercise of the natural right to self-defense pro-
vided for by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” 
After the signing, South Pacific Forum Chair Julius Chan, prime min-
ister of Papua New Guinea, stated that he would have preferred a more
complete agreement relating to the exporting of uranium and the pres-
ence and transit of nuclear-powered vessels; he also expressed the wish
that monitoring of the environment be continued as regards all results of
nuclear activity and that financial compensation be offered if necessary. 
Flosse stressed that no nuclear testing area had been as closely studied
as Moruroa from the environmental point of view. The expert mission
requested of the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) would pub-
lish its results on the nonhazardous nature of the tests.27
With the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba
treaties, the whole of the southern hemisphere had begun to become a
nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed
in 1996; the Non-Proliferation Treaty was considered at the New York
Conference in April and May 2000. Would the world at last be rid of the
threat of nuclear apocalypse and the Pacific Islands again become the
“Happy Isles”? (Coutau-Bégarie 1987, 265).
Not only is it not as simple as that,28 but also nobody can hope to con-
struct a haven of peace in isolation from the rest of the planet. For the
South Pacific, since the final adoption of the Rarotonga Treaty, the situa-
tion is fairly disparate, with some problems being happily resolved and
new threats now occurring.
One very positive aspect is the warming (albeit still somewhat fragile)
of the relationship between France and the South Pacific countries. For
example, in Paris, at the end of October 1997, Jim Bolger, the New Zea-
land prime minister, stated that his country had forgiven France for the
Rainbow Warrior affair. 
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France wanted to project the image of a friendly and altruistic power,
while the United Kingdom had withdrawn in 1996 from the regional insti-
tutions,29 the United States was closing its embassies in the South Pacific
and considerably reducing its aid,30 and Australia was also apparently dis-
engaging. John Howard stated at the end of August 2001: “The Pacific has
to find its own solutions. Australia cannot and has no intention of deter-
mining the course of events in the region . . . Independence also means tak-
ing charge of one’s own destiny.”31
France therefore maintained the South Pacific assistance fund set up by
Jacques Chirac, responsibility for which former President Mitterrand had
given to a diplomat (acting as permanent secretary for the South Pacific)
attached to the prime minister’s office. In recent years, this fund has been
worth some 15 million French francs annually.
However, the challenging of France is not over. The battle continues
around the theme of how safe testing really was. The Nuclear Arms Obser-
vatory (Observatoire des armes nucléaires françaises, or obsarm) set up
in 1984 has published highly critical reviews on the health of former
Moruroa workers, and, despite the somewhat reassuring iaea report,
they are worried about the possible future contamination of the ocean.32
This action is echoed in the territory by the Evangelical Church, and in
the Pacific by the Protestant churches, but also, more discreetly, by the
Catholics. As time passes, the Evangelical Church’s position becomes
tougher. The Protestants find it hard to accept the secrecy policy used by
France. A gesture of repentance, but also financial compensation, is being
demanded of France.
Paradoxically, the French presence in the Pacific has found new justifi-
cation since recent developments. Many problems are now arising. There
is a worrying situation in Fiji (multiple coups), in Papua New Guinea and
Solomon Islands (ethnic tensions), and in Vanuatu (political instability).
Faced with extensive immigration from many Island countries, Australia
and New Zealand are much less hostile now to the French presence in the
Pacific and only provide moderate support to independence movements.
An alarming picture of the Pacific Islands can be drawn. There is a real
risk of seeing most of the Pacific Island entities become the neglected vic-
tims of globalization. Some states, principally the corrupt elites, are allow-
ing themselves to be manipulated to launder dirty money.33 Suspect net-
works, linked with the drug trade or fraudulent banking operations, are
operating in the region.
The disruption of climate patterns has become a major concern, mainly
for the atoll archipelagoes. The 2001 Forum expressed its concern and
dialogue 1 • regnault 353
asked the United States to review its position on the Kyoto Protocol.
According to the preamble to the Rarotonga Treaty, the states of the South
Pacific are “determined to ensure that the bounty and beauty of the land
and sea in their region should remain the heritage of their peoples and
their descendants in perpetuity.” It is no longer the nuclear threat that con-
cerns them but the rise in the level of the ocean waters and the violence
of the cyclones.
* * *
This essay is a shortened version of an article published in French in 2003
in the Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, which cordially grants permission for this
publication.
Notes
1 In June 1988, Roland Dumas, then minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that
France was favorable to Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, provided that “such a
commitment stems from the unanimous will of all the states concerned and that
it can be satisfactorily monitored” (quoted in Maurice and Gohin 1991, 477).
2 Under public pressure, in 1984 the Labour government set up a Royal Com-
mission of Inquiry into British testing in Australia. The results were published in
The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia,
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985.
3 The United States tested on Christmas Island, which was a source of con-
cern to the people of French Polynesia (in the Marquesas in particular) and West-
ern Sämoa.
4 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letter from the French ambassador in
Wellington, dated 4 October 1963.
5 Le Monde, 2 February 1963.
6 Letter from the French ambassador dated 22 November 1963.
7 Letter dated 4 October 1963.
8 Opposition to France was also sustained by unfounded rumors and false
images: The Australian and New Zealand media illustrated reports on French
testing with pictures from Bikini and Enewetak. A photographic montage showed
an atomic mushroom cloud above Tahiti (Paciﬁc Island Trade News [Sydney],
17 July 1972).
9 In 1842, the Reverend Pritchard, who hoped that Tahiti would become a
British protectorate, was moved aside by a maneuver in favor of France. This
affair led to a serious misunderstanding between the Protestant countries of the
region and France (De Deckker 1997).
10 The Evangelical Church of French Polynesia, which took up an anti-
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nuclear stance in 1982, believed that “nuclear testing has been and will remain for
all time the greatest crime ever committed against the Fenua” (the Fenua being
the land and country of French Polynesia) (Vea Porotetani [Papeete monthly],
October 2000).
11 The largest of the regional organizations, the South Pacific Commission
was established in 1947 (becoming the Pacific Community in 1998) at the initia-
tive of the colonial powers with territories in the region. Its charter precluded any
political debate. As independence arrived in the Pacific, the new countries set up
the South Pacific Forum, an institution existing alongside the commission.
12 The Pacific peoples believed that, in order to belong to the region, they
had to have been there since before the arrival of the Europeans. On occasion
they have claimed first occupants’ rights. The way they viewed New Zealand and
Australian leaders could therefore have been totally negative. But religious crite-
ria, history, and the political skill of these larger countries rallied the people of
the South Pacific behind them, especially against France.
13 Le Monde, 15–16 July 1973.
14 In 1972, Greenpeace attempted to hinder testing by sailing close to
Moruroa. In 1973, well-known French figures came to support the anti-nuclear
activists. Some New Zealanders joined the movement with the frigate Otago.
Their prime minister declared: “We are not here to interfere in what the French
are doing, but to witness illegal acts” (Le Monde, 16 July 1973).
15 For Protestant German theologian Helmut Gollwitzer, this weapon pos-
sesses particular features: “severe or irreversible damage (during testing also) to
God’s creation (nature and humankind) and possible destruction of the whole
planet. Any use of this weapon must therefore be opposed, as must its use as part
of a deterrence policy, as well as any research in this field” (Encylopédie du
Protestantisme [Paris: Éditions du Cerf; Geneva: Éditions Labor et Fides] 1995,
1, 618–619). This vision was also the subject of a solemn statement by the World
Council of Churches in 1983. In 1955, Pope Pius XII stated his opposition to
nuclear testing. The 1963 papal encyclical Pacem in Terris proposed disarmament
and the banning of nuclear weapons. Soon, Protestants and Catholics, in differ-
ent ways, would simultaneously assert their opposition to testing.
16 The Pacific Conference of Churches was set up in 1966 by the Protestants,
and the Pacific Conference of Bishops joined in 1976. The Pacific Conference of
Churches was a very active organization against residual forms of colonialism
and the nuclear threat. 
17 Jakarta claimed Dutch New Guinea as an integral part of Indonesia and
made it into an Indonesian province (Irian Jaya) in 1963.
18 For example, this statement from the conference report, published by the
Pacific Concerns Resource Center: “our environment continues to be despoiled
by foreign powers” (11).
19 The Australian and New Zealand Labour parties, after adopting anti-
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nuclear stances, won power on 5 March 1983 and 14 July 1984, respectively. Dur-
ing military maneuvers, a British aircraft carrier sustained damage and requested
permission to call at Sydney arsenal for repairs. Canberra declined. After US Sec-
retary of State George Schultz intervened, authorization was finally given.
20 At the United Nations, on 2 December 1986, the resolution to reinscribe
New Caledonia on the list of non–self-governing territories was passed, with 89
votes for, 24 against, and 34 abstentions.
21 Gaston Flosse was born in 1931. Once a primary school teacher, he went
into business and then politics. He became the leader of Tahoera‘a Huiraatira
(Rally of the People). He adopted the goal of French Polynesia’s self-government
in 1978, and has dominated politics there since 1982, serving first as vice presi-
dent (1982–1984), and as president from 1984 to 1987 and since 1991.
22 Le Monde, 17 December 1986. Ivan Barko has analyzed the difficult rela-
tions between France and Australia while Jacques Chirac was prime minister
(2003).
23 Vanuatu had established ties to Libya and Cuba.
24 Efforts included scientific missions (Haroun Tazieff, Jacques Cousteau,
New Zealand scientist H R Atkinson); a diplomatic mission by Régis Debray; an
invitation to Tahitian pastors to visit Moruroa; a roundtable meeting in Papeete
(October 1989) on the health and economic impacts of nuclear testing; and
establishment of the French University of the Pacific.
25 However, the Forum leaders remained cautious, fearing a resumption of
testing and its long-term consequences (Le Monde, 22 June 1994).
26 In August 1985, the World Council of Churches issued a booklet, In the
Name of life . . . No! (and a French version, Au nom du Dieu de vie . . . Non!),
which was very critical of the resumption of testing.
27 The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea), a UN agency with head-
quarters in Vienna, was established in October 1956 for the purpose of promot-
ing the peaceful use of atomic energy and controlling nuclear activities to avoid
their use for military purposes. The agency was involved in the verification of
compliance with the rules laid down in the Nuclear Non-Proliteration Treaty and
the treaties instituting the nuclear-weapon-free zones.
28 Readers may recall the Indian and Pakistani testing in May 1998, the US
refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, George W Bush’s anti-missile
shield, and, more generally, all other threats posed by current weaponry.
29 The following year, the United Kingdom decided to reenter the Pacific
Community, using the pretext that it possessed Pitcairn, the former refuge of the
Bounty mutineers. This enables the United Kingdom to attend conferences of the
organization, while providing a contribution of only 0.007 percent of its budget.
[Britain has since withdrawn again from the Pacific Community.]
30 Le Monde, 6 September 1996.
31 La Dépêche de Tahiti [Papeete weekly], 24 August 2001. Australia’s sup-
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port for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi) shows that
their attitude has changed radically. [See Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka’s article,
“Australian Foreign Policy and the ramsi Intervention in Solomon Islands,” this
issue, 283–309.] 
32 The Radiological Situation on the Atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa.
iaea report, published in December 1998. “For many Polynesians and Melane-
sians who live off the sea, to imagine poisoned fish and reef destruction is intol-
erable. No matter how many reports are published demonstrating the absence of
any leaks or pollution, they will not shake the certainties widely shared by the
South Pacific peoples. Cold reasoning and Cartesian logic have no hold over
emotional positions. The peoples of the Pacific perceive nuclear testing as viola-
tion and sacrilege” (Le Monde, 22 June 1994).
33 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has
threatened the states of Nauru, Niue, Vanuatu, and Cook Islands with sanctions
after 30 September 2001 if their tax legislation is not changed, which for the
moment is not fully the case. 
References
Barko, Ivan
2003 L’Australie face a la politique française dans le Pacifique de 1981 a
1988. In François Mitterrand et les territoires français du Pacifique
(1981–1988): Mutations, drames et recompositions; Enjeux interna-
tionaux et franco-français, edited by Jean-Marc Regnault, 507–517.
Paris: Les Indes savantes.
Cordonnier, Isabelle
1995 La France dans le Paciﬁque Sud: Approche géostratégique. Paris: Pub-
lisud.
Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé
1987 Géostratégie du Paciﬁque. Paris: Economica.
Crocombe, Ron
1995 The Paciﬁc Islands and the USA. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, Uni-
versity of the South Pacific; Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development
Program, East-West Center.
De Deckker, Paul 
1997 Jacques-Antoine Moerenhout (1797–1879): Ethnologue et consul.
Papeete: Au Vent des îles.
Denoon, Donald, Philippa Mein-Smith, with Marivic Wyndham
2000 A History of Australia, New Zealand, and the Paciﬁc. Oxford: Black-
well Publishers.
Duval, Marcel, and Yves Le Baut
1992 L’Arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? Paris: spm.
dialogue 1 • regnault 357
Fisher, Georges
1982 La France et le désarmement. Annuaire Français de Droit International
28:79–126.
Howe, K R, Robert C Kiste, and Brij V Lal
1994 Tides of History: The Paciﬁc Islands in the Twentieth Century. Syd-
ney: Allen & Unwin; Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.
Maurice, Pierre, and Olivier Gohin
1991 Géopolitique et géostratégie dans l’Hémisphere Sud. Université de la
Réunion.
Peyrefitte, Alain
1997 C’était de Gaulle. Vol 2: La France reprend sa place dans le monde.
Paris: Éditions de Fallois, Fayard.
Regnault, Jean-Marc
2000 La France à la recherche de sites nucléaires; 1957–1963. Cahiers du
Centre d’Études d’Histoire de la Défense 12:29–54. English transla-
tion published as: France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963.
The Journal of Military History 67 (Oct 2003): 1223–1248.
Szurek, Sandra
1997 De Rarotonga à Bangkok et Pelindaba. Note sur les traités constitutifs
de nouvelles zones exemptes d’armes nucléaires. Annuaire Français
de Droit International, 1996, 164–186. Paris: Centre national de la
recherche scientifique.
Tubanavau-Salabula, Losena, Josua M Namoce, and Nic Maclellan
1999 Kirisimasi: Fijian Troops at Britain’s Christmas Island Nuclear Tests.
Suva: Pacific Concerns Resource Center.
Vaïsse, Maurice
1998 La Grandeur: Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle. Paris: Fayard.
